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To Dignity Through the  
Back Door: Tsilhqot’in and the 
Aboriginal Title Test  
Andrée Boisselle* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important aspects of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
judgment in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia1 consists in the 
clarification of the test for Aboriginal title. The judgment settles a 
controversy that had arisen following the Court’s decisions in R. v. 
Marshall; R. v. Bernard2 regarding the degree of historical use of the 
land consistent with the recognition of Aboriginal title. Setting aside the 
notion that title might only be established by Aboriginal groups on the 
“definite tracts of land” “intensively used” by their ancestors, the Court 
adopts a territorial approach to title, consistent with the fact that areas 
used intensively for sustenance and dwelling purposes are typically 
enclosed within a wider land base to which a given Indigenous society 
has a long-standing, living relationship, shaping its culture and its 
identity. This article critically examines the Court’s clarification of the 
test. Beyond the important victory that the outcome of the case presents 
for Indigenous peoples across Canada, a closer look at the Court’s 
reasoning exposes some of the troubling features of Aboriginal title 
doctrine, as well as other potentially deeply transformative features of 
this doctrine, as it now stands.  
On the first count, I argue that while the Court suggests that the issue of 
title “must be approached from both the common law perspective and the 
Aboriginal perspective”, it still fails to draw on Indigenous laws as a source 
of authoritative standards shaping the content of the title test itself. The test 
                                                                                                                       
*  I am grateful to Kent McNeil and Kerry Wilkins for reading a draft of this article and 
providing very helpful feedback. Needless to say, any shortcomings or errors are entirely my own. 
1  [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”]. 
2  [2005] S.C.J. No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall and Bernard”]. 
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remains unequivocally grounded in Euro-Canadian, common law norms, 
illustrating the difficulty of overcoming the Canadian legal system’s  
deep-rooted ethnocentricity. As such, Tsilhqot’in inherits and perpetuates the 
profoundly skewed conceptual apparatus of Canadian jurisprudence framing 
the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown. 
However, I also believe that Tsilhqot’in effects a powerful resetting of 
the conversation on Indigenous land rights in Canada. This is not only 
because of the outcome in this particular instance, but for a deeper 
doctrinal reason. Indeed, one of the Court’s most important contributions 
in Tsilhqot’in lies in its decisive association of the notion of “prior 
occupation” of the land  the main legal issue underlying the title test  
with the historical control of the land rather than with the manner or 
intensity of its use. This amounts to a significant recharacterization of the 
evidentiary issue underlying title claims, since it focuses on the exercise of 
jurisdiction by Indigenous polities on their territory, rather than on their 
factual survival on the land. The Court’s clarification of the meaning of 
occupancy directs the evidentiary focus on the political and legal agency of 
Indigenous societies on their traditional territories, and draws attention to 
the norms governing the historical recognition of territorial boundaries 
between and among Indigenous societies. Thus, although the Court relied 
solely on common law precedents to give meaning to the norm of 
occupation, its restatement of the title test in Tsilhqot’in effectively takes 
Indigenous normativity to the heart of the test, decisively moving 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence past “terra nullius” thinking. 
The arguments I develop in this article each correspond to a problem 
besetting Aboriginal title jurisprudence. The first is that this jurisprudence 
does not afford equal weight to Euro-Canadian and Indigenous 
normative commitments in establishing what relevantly qualifies as 
“prior occupation” of the land. The Supreme Court does not improve the 
record on that issue in Tsilhqot’in, missing an important opportunity to 
decolonize the Canadian legal imagination and to set Aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence on a truly reconciliatory path. The second problem,  
more technical, regards the skewed application of the common law  
norm of occupation: if the content of that norm is to draw solely on  
Euro-Canadian references and precedents, then it should at least be 
applied consistently across the common law rather than be given a sui 
generis interpretation in the context of Aboriginal rights that entrenches 
ethnocentric double standards. On this count, Tsilhqot’in represents an 
important doctrinal victory with far-ranging positive implications for 
Indigenous peoples in Canada.  
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1.  Privileging Euro-Canadian Over Indigenous Normative 
Frameworks in Establishing What Relevantly Qualifies as “Prior 
Occupation” of the Land 
The skewing of the normative dialogue on the respective rights and 
responsibilities of Indigenous and settler societies in favour of Euro-
Canadian law is an old and pervasive feature of Canadian Aboriginal 
law. The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Van der Peet,3 in 1996, could 
be considered its first attempt at addressing the role of law as a crucial 
mechanism of colonial dispossession. Implicitly acknowledging that the 
unilateral imposition of foreign laws on Indigenous societies was unjust 
and had to change, the Court stated that the delineation of Aboriginal 
rights recognized and affirmed at section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
19824 had to “take into account the perspective of the aboriginal people 
claiming the right. … while at the same time taking into account the 
perspective of the common law” such that “[t]rue reconciliation will, 
equally, place weight on each.”5 However, the Court proceeded in the 
same breath to insert a major caveat into this reconciliatory aspiration: 
taking into consideration “the Aboriginal perspective” had to be done 
without straining “the Canadian legal and constitutional structure”.6 In 
other words, the Court purports to recalibrate a relationship characterized 
by dispossession, oppression and assimilation by recognizing the “prior 
occupation” of the land by Indigenous people, but somehow without 
coming to terms with their full integrity as societies  sovereign over 
themselves and their lands, in a nation-to-nation relationship with the 
Canadian state.7  
                                                                                                                       
3  [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.). 
4  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution”]. 
5  Id., at paras. 49-50. 
6  Id., at para. 49; see also Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 
3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 82 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
7  In R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] S.C.J. No. 20, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (S.C.C.), the Court 
illustrated what it meant by framing the Aboriginal perspective so as not to strain the Canadian 
constitutional structure. The Aboriginal appellant was convicted for organizing gambling activities 
on reserve, in keeping with his band’s regulation of those activities but contrary to the Canadian 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. His attempt to invoke s. 35(1) of the Constitution to protect his 
band’s right to self-govern, including its right to manage its reserve lands as it saw fit, was rejected 
by the Supreme Court as casting its inquiry “at a level of excessive generality” (at para. 27). The 
Court proceeded to recharacterize the claim as “the right to participate in, and to regulate, high 
stakes gambling activities on the reservation” (at para. 26), to then rule that the evidence did not 
meet the threshold established in Van der Peet for a right to be protected by s. 35(1): it did not 
demonstrate that gambling “was of central significance to the distinctive culture” of the Ojibwa. 
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A year later, in Delgamuukw,8 the Court began to navigate the 
tension inherent in this scheme which seeks reconciliation without strain. 
Faced with the challenge of theorizing Aboriginal title, the Court 
establishes that it is grounded “both in the common law and in the 
aboriginal perspective on land”.9 However, while this principle of 
placing “equal weight” on Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal perspectives 
on land quickly becomes a leitmotiv of the Court’s Aboriginal rights and 
title jurisprudence, the manner in which it effectively conceives of and 
gives voice to each of the “dual perspectives” actually maintains 
Indigenous polities and their laws in a position of inferiority.10  
In Delgamuukw, the Court locates the source of Aboriginal title in 
the occupation of land before the British assertion of sovereignty. The 
main onus on an Indigenous community claiming title over a piece of 
land will therefore be to demonstrate that it had occupied the territory 
within which that land was located for an indefinite period of time before 
the date of British sovereignty assertion over that specific part of the 
developing Dominion. The other two criteria that the Court enunciates as 
part of the title test  continuous occupation since British sovereignty, 
and exclusive occupation by the claimant group  are certainly also 
relevant to the establishment of title.11 But the main battleground, in 
Delgamuukw as in Tsilhqot’in, consisted in the conceptualization of 
occupation itself, and it is on this central idea that the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                       
In contrast, the Court’s jurisprudence shelters the settler state’s assertions of sovereignty from 
scrutiny. In R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at para. 49 (S.C.C.), Dickson 
C.J.C. writes: “while British policy towards the native population was based on respect for their right 
to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears 
witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and 
indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown”. See Kent McNeil, “Indigenous 
Nations and the Legal Relativity of European Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in North America”, 
in Sandra Tomsons and Lorraine Mayer, eds., Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues 
(Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 242 [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Indigenous 
Nations’”]. 
8  Delgamuukw, supra, note 6. 
9  Id., at para. 147. 
10  See John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia” (1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537 [hereinafter “Borrows”]. 
11  With regard to continuity: if the claimant group does not occupy its traditional territory 
anymore because it was displaced or dispossessed post-assertion of sovereignty, its title may still be 
recognized but only give rise to financial compensation rather than repossession of the land in 
question. Regarding exclusivity: if occupation was shared with another group, title may be 
recognized if those groups can demonstrate the exclusivity of their joint occupation as against other 
people. A declaration of title in such a case would imply the continuation of their shared possession 
and jurisdiction over the title area. See Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal 
Title” (2015) 48:3 U.B.C. L.R. [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Exclusive Occupation’”]. 
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reasoning in both of these seminal cases relies unduly on the common 
law, conveniently glossing over Indigenous political and legal autonomy.  
Indeed, if the Court took seriously the parity suggested by its 
acknowledgment that true reconciliation requires that “equal weight” be 
placed on “Aboriginal perspectives” and on the common law, it would 
seek to formulate standards derived from a true normative dialogue 
between Euro-Canadian and Indigenous perspectives. In other words, to 
be on par with the common law, the relevant “Aboriginal perspectives” 
would have to be derived from the Indigenous laws pertaining to the 
manner in which they asserted their collective authority over the land. 
The Court’s driving inquiry would be to find the place where those 
respective normative universes share actual standards.  
Instead, although it recognized that the “relationship between 
common law and pre-existing systems of Aboriginal law”12 plays a role 
in grounding Aboriginal title, the Court in Delgamuukw assigned very 
different roles to the legal traditions facing each other in that 
relationship. The normative source of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J.C. 
explains, is the “physical fact of occupation, which derives from 
the common law principle that occupation is proof of possession in 
law”.13 There is no reference to the contribution of Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en law in establishing that standard, and therefore seemingly 
no normative value ascribed to such a contribution. Chief Justice Lamer 
notes that while the parties agreed on appeal “that proof of historic 
occupation was required to make out a claim to aboriginal title,”14 they 
disagreed on what should count toward such proof.15 But rather than 
proceeding to examine Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en norms regarding 
occupation to determine how they might inform the Canadian standard 
underlying title, the Chief Justice’s reasoning then reveals the 
discrepancy between the roles he reserves to each legal tradition.  
“If” an Aboriginal society had laws in relation to land, begins  
Lamer C.J.C., such laws will help to establish the “aboriginal perspective 
on the occupation of their lands”. Such perspective cannot, however, be 
“gleaned” exclusively from Indigenous laws. The status of those laws is 
                                                                                                                       
12  Delgamuukw, supra, note 6, at para. 114. 
13  Id. 
14  Id., at para. 146. 
15  The Crown asserted that in order to establish Aboriginal title, occupation should amount 
to the physical occupation of the land in question. The Gitksan argued that Aboriginal title arose at 
least in part from and “should reflect the pattern of land holdings” under their own laws: see id., at 
paras. 146-147. 
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on par with other elements of the “practices, customs and traditions of 
Aboriginal peoples” and must be assessed as a part of this whole.16 As 
Lamer C.J.C. continues, the relegation of Indigenous laws to the role of 
historical facts among other pieces of material evidence, shaping what 
the Court calls “the Aboriginal perspective”, gets ever clearer. Outlining 
the norm of occupation, that is, what constitutes sufficient occupation to 
ground title, the Chief Justice draws on common law standards “ranging 
from the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of 
fields to ... exploiting its resources”.17 Relevant Indigenous laws, 
including historical Indigenous system of land tenure and land use, shall 
serve alongside “the group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and 
technological abilities”18 as well as geographical information detailing 
“the character of the lands claimed”19 to provide what seemingly 
amounts to a mere context of application for the common law norm 
of sufficient occupation. In other words, laws on the Indigenous side of 
the equation do not, for the purposes of interpreting the standard of 
occupation, actually play a direct normative role.  
This reading of Delgamuukw is confirmed in the next major 
judgment of the Supreme Court on Aboriginal title in the sister cases of 
Marshall and Bernard, where the majority (now led by McLachlin C.J.C.) 
describes in the following terms its methodology for assessing the title 
claim at issue:  
The Court’s task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal right is to 
examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that 
practice, as faithfully and objectively as it can, into a modern legal 
right. … The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice from the 
perspective of the aboriginal people. But in translating it to a common 
law right, the Court must also consider the European perspective; the 
nature of the right at common law must be examined to determine 
whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it.20  
In this “exercise in translating aboriginal practices to modern 
rights”,21 as the majority calls it, the role of the “Aboriginal perspective”  
i.e., of the evidence adduced concerning the Indigenous material and 
normative universe pre-British sovereignty assertion  is to enable the 
                                                                                                                       
16  Id., at para. 148. 
17  Id., at para. 149. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  Marshall and Bernard, supra, note 2, at para. 48 (emphasis added). 
21  Id. (emphasis added). 
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judges to take what they conceive of as a culturally sensitive approach to 
the determination of Aboriginal rights. For the majority, this requires that 
the “translation” exercise “not be conducted in a formalistic or narrow 
way. The Court should take a generous view of the aboriginal practice 
and should not insist on exact conformity to the precise legal parameters 
of the common law right.”22 But what remains at issue “is whether the 
[Aboriginal] practice corresponds to the core [common law] concepts of 
the legal right claimed”.23 This is a very different exercise than that of 
articulating the parameters of a collectivity’s territorial authority, 
speaking equally to European and Indigenous sources of legitimacy.  
Two of the Supreme Court justices in Marshall and Bernard, Lebel J. 
and Fish J., disown their colleagues’ reasoning on that basis. While 
concurring with the majority on the result (i.e., that the evidence offered 
in both cases was not sufficient to establish Aboriginal title), they 
denounce an approach “too narrowly focused on common law concepts 
relating to property interests”.24 They write: 
The role of the aboriginal perspective cannot be simply to help in the 
interpretation of aboriginal practices in order to assess whether they 
conform to common law concepts of title. The aboriginal perspective 
shapes the very concept of aboriginal title. “Aboriginal law should not 
just be received as evidence that Aboriginal peoples did something in 
the past on a piece of land. It is more than evidence: it is actually law. 
And so, there should be some way to bring to the decision-making 
process those laws that arise from the standards of the indigenous 
people before the court.”25  
Tsilhqot’in presented the Court with a new opportunity to restate its 
theoretical and methodological approach along the lines articulated by 
Lebel J. and Fish J., ushering a jurisprudence based on normative dialogue 
between equally respected legal orders. This is what placing “equal weight” 
on Euro-Canadian and Indigenous perspectives, respecting the inherent 
dignity of Indigenous societies, and moving beyond the colonial unilateral 
imposition of Euro-Canadian terms simply requires. Instead, the Court 
decided to continue on the path it has treaded since Delgamuukw – stating a 
powerful egalitarian principle, but shying away from giving it real effect, as 
if doing so might “strain the Canadian legal and constitutional order.” 
                                                                                                                       
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id., at para. 110. 
25  Id., at para. 130, quoting John Borrows, “Creating an Indigenous Legal Community” 
(2005) 50 McGill L.J. 153, at 173. 
34 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Indeed, the Court reiterates in Tsilhqot’in the principle whereby 
“[t]he dual perspectives of the common law and of the Aboriginal group 
bear equal weight in evaluating a claim for Aboriginal title.”26 The Court 
then acknowledges that in Marshall and Bernard, it set out the standard 
of occupation by sole reference to the common law, but claims that this 
is compatible with giving its due to the Aboriginal perspective on what 
occupation amounts to:  
The Court in Marshall; Bernard confirmed that nomadic and semi-
nomadic groups could establish title to land, provided they establish 
sufficient physical possession, which is a question of fact. … While the 
issue was framed in terms of whether the common law test for possession 
was met, the Court did not resile from the need to consider the 
perspective of the Aboriginal group in question; sufficient occupation is a 
‘question of fact, depending on all the circumstances, in particular the 
nature of the land and the manner in which it is commonly used’.27  
In effect, the Court is saying that giving “equal weight” to the 
perspective of the common law and of the Aboriginal group is 
satisfactorily achieved by treating the first as law and the second as the 
factual context relevant to determining whether or not the legal standard 
has been met.  
This reading is confirmed by the fact that in Tsilhqot’in, the Court 
clarifies the standard of occupation by sole reference to the common  
law  as I will now discuss, turning to the content of the standard itself. 
I will also show that although the judgment fails to put Euro-Canadian 
and Indigenous law explicitly on the same footing, the Court’s 
interpretation of the common law standard of occupation shapes the title 
test in a manner that, in practice if not in principle, introduces into 
Canadian law some of the respect due to Indigenous laws and to the pre-
existing sovereignty of Indigenous nations. In other words, Tsilhqot’in 
leaves us with a test for title that affirms the inherent dignity of 
Indigenous societies  if only through the backdoor. 
2.  Dual Perspectives or Double Standards? 
At issue in Tsilhqot’in was whether occupation consists in the 
“regular and exclusive use” of a given territory, or in a more stringent 
standard, the “intensive use of definite tracts of land”. Applying the 
                                                                                                                       
26  Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at para. 14. 
27  Id., at para. 44, quoting Marshall and Bernard, supra, note 2, at para. 66. 
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former led Vickers J., the trial judge, to affirm the Tsilhqot’in 
people’s title to a portion of the claim area as well as to a small area 
outside the claim area, totalling less than 5 per cent of what the 
Tsilhqot’in regard as their traditional territory.28 The British Columbia 
Court of Appeal invalidated this conclusion, holding the correct legal 
standard to be the second one, effectively reducing the possible ambit 
of Aboriginal title to specific dwelling or harvesting sites  the 
equivalent of “postage stamp” areas within the Tsilhqot’in people’s 
traditional territory. To understand the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s clarification of what counts as “occupation” at common law, 
it is useful to re-examine the source of the divergence on this point 
between the trial judge (with whom the Supreme Court concurred) 
and the Court of Appeal.  
The resolution of this divergence by the Supreme Court can again be 
traced back to Delgamuukw. In that case, Lamer C.J.C. relied on 
Professor Kent McNeil’s seminal study, Common Law Aboriginal Title,29 
to expose the private property principles that could be used to ground 
Aboriginal title at common law:  
Professor McNeil has convincingly argued that at common law, the fact 
of physical occupation is proof of possession at law, which in turn will 
ground title to the land …. Physical occupation may be established in a 
variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through 
cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of 
land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources …30  
This passage states the law correctly, insofar as possession does 
ground title at common law and can be established through occupation. 
However, a wide range of manifestations of possession and types of 
occupation have been accepted as grounding title at common law. The 
suggestion in the above passage that occupation means “physical” 
occupation, connoting the living presence of people on the specific 
parcel claimed, or their active presence mediated by artefacts indicating 
their “regular use” of the land, is not supported at common law. 
Requiring physical presence and regular use of the land amounts to 
applying a much higher standard to Aboriginal title claims than that 
                                                                                                                       
28  The claim area amounted to about 5 per cent of Tsilhqot’in traditional territory. The other 
95 per cent were not in issue in the case. 
29  Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
30  Delgamuukw, supra, note 6, at para. 149. 
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warranted by the jurisprudence. Summarizing the case law on this issue, 
Professor McNeil notes: 
At least as important as physical acts on or in relation to the land is the 
intention to hold and use the land for one’s own purposes and to exclude 
others who have not been given permission to enter. This is why placing 
markers or blazing trees around the perimeter of the land demonstrate 
occupation, even if the land is not otherwise occupied or used. In other 
words, the occupier is not obliged to use the land in any particular way, as 
long as the intention to occupy is present and manifest through public acts 
in relation to the land and no one else is in actual occupation.31 
Professor McNeil adds:  
At common law, effective control can be demonstrated by regular use 
of the land, but does not depend on use of specific sites. Indeed, the 
common law cases clearly reveal that control of, or even notice of 
intention to control, the perimeter of a tract of land is sufficient to 
establish occupation of all the land within the perimeter.32  
In other words, what “occupation” means for the purposes of 
acquiring possessory title at common law is only “effective control”. The 
norm has a subjective element  the intention to hold the land for one’s 
own purposes  and an objective one  the capacity to concretize one’s 
intention, and the signalling of one’s intention to make it outwardly 
knowable. This exhausts the content of the norm. All other criteria, such 
as “physical presence on” or “use of” the land are evidentiary 
derivatives: accepted ways of demonstrating possession/occupation.  
After the emphasis placed by Lamer C.J.C. on “physical” occupation, 
the majority’s approach to the notion of occupation slipped further toward 
replacing its central criterion, effective control, with that of regular use, and 
even more stringently, of intensive use, in Marshall and Bernard. Witness 
the slippage in the following passage of the majority’s judgment:  
In summary, exclusive possession in the sense of intention and capacity 
to control is required to establish aboriginal title. Typically, this is 
established by showing regular occupancy or use of definite tracts 
of land for hunting, fishing or exploiting resources: Delgamuukw, at 
para. 149. Less intensive uses may give rise to different rights.33  
                                                                                                                       
31  Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?”, July 1, 2013, 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294552> [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Aboriginal’”], at 12. 
32  Id., at 13. 
33  Marshall and Bernard, supra, note 2, at para. 70 (emphasis added). 
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As a result, the Mi’kmaq saw their claim to title denied in Marshall 
and Bernard, as the evidence presented regarding their connection to 
their traditional territory did not meet what the majority deemed to be the 
requisite intensity of land use. Writing for the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal in Tsilhqot’in, Groberman J. latched on to this notion of intensive 
use and turned it into the primary evidentiary threshold that claimants 
must meet to ground Aboriginal title.  
As Professor McNeil pointed out, this was not only unsubstantiated 
at common law, but actually entrenched a double standard. Most 
common law precedents discussing the issue of sufficient occupation, he 
explained, involve cases of adverse possession. This means that the 
standard of occupation that deems “effective control” of the land over the 
statutory limitation period as sufficient to ground possessory title arose in 
the context of wrongdoing. It allows those who occupy land they did not 
originally own to acquire a possessory title over it by ousting the true 
owner. Since Aboriginal title claimants typically seek title over lands 
they have rightfully occupied for an indefinite period of time prior to the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, they should be held to a lower standard 
than wrongdoers. Instead, requiring them to prove the intensive use of 
their lands in order to see their title recognized effectively held them to a 
higher standard.34 A double standard unfair to Aboriginal claimants was 
thus threatening to take hold in the case law following the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Tsilhqot’in, based on the above reading of 
Delgamuukw and of Marshall and Bernard. 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Tsilhqot’in puts an end to this 
budding line of jurisprudence. Firmly re-establishing the criterion of 
control at the core of the notion of occupation sufficient to ground title at 
common law, the Court even cuts out the reference to “physical” 
occupation in its quotation of the famous Delgamuukw passage 
reproduced above.35 The Court forcefully states: 
The common law perspective imports the idea of possession and 
control of the lands. At common law, possession extends beyond sites 
that are physically occupied, like a house, to surrounding lands that are 
used and over which effective control is exercised.36 
                                                                                                                       
34  McNeil, “Aboriginal”, supra, note 31, at 13-14. 
35  See Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at para. 37. 
36  Id., at para. 36. 
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Although the Court does refer to the use of the land, this notion of 
use recedes to its proper place as evidence that may be offered toward 
fulfilling the actual legal criterion of effective control: 
To sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal 
group in question must show that it has historically acted in a way that 
would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its own 
purposes. This standard does not demand notorious or visible use akin 
to proving a claim for adverse possession, but neither can the 
occupation be purely subjective or internal. There must be evidence of a 
strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts 
of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating 
that the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under 
the exclusive stewardship of the claimant group.37  
In summary, the Court thus affirms that it is the control of the land, 
rather than the manner and intensity of its use, that must remain the focus 
of the assessment of occupation. Even though this simply restates the 
existing common law standard, and does not draw upon Indigenous 
normativity to ostensibly ground the legitimacy of the title test equally in 
Indigenous legality,38 the clarification of the norm still has important 
implications. Indeed, the nature of the evidence required to prove control 
over the territory leads us onto a terrain implying a much more 
egalitarian, nation-to-nation relationship between the settler state and 
Indigenous claimant groups than the one underlying Canadian Aboriginal 
law so far. 
First, affirming the notion of control as the central requirement of 
possessory title brings the different elements of the test of occupation set 
                                                                                                                       
37  Id., at para. 38 (emphasis added). 
38  As discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court views the “Aboriginal 
perspective” on the land as relevant, but considers it at the level of factual evidence serving to assess 
whether the common law standard has been met. It is interesting to note in that respect that the 
Supreme Court explicitly ties the examination of the use of the land to the role of the Aboriginal 
perspective in applying the test for title. All kinds of uses are relevant evidence to bring to the 
demonstration of effective control of the land by the claimant group: 
a culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of territories for hunting, fishing, 
trapping and foraging is “sufficient” use to ground Aboriginal title, provided that such 
use, on the facts of a particular case, evinces an intention on the part of the Aboriginal 
group to hold or possess the land in a manner comparable to what would be required to 
establish title at common law (id., at para. 42). 
The trial judge, Vickers J., assessed the use by the Tsilhqot’in people of a large number of sites 
on the territory to which they claimed title, and determined that such use was regular and exclusive. 
The Supreme Court does not disturb that finding, given that the norm applied was “consistent with 
the correct legal test” and that no palpable and overriding error was shown in the factual conclusions. 
(Id., at paras. 51-52). 
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out in Delgamuukw in close proximity. In particular, the element labelled 
as “sufficient occupation” now appears as either equivalent to or 
subsumed under the element of “exclusive occupation”. The Court 
defines the latter in very similar terms as occupation tout court: “the 
intention and capacity to control the land”.39 On that basis, it is fair to 
think that if an Indigenous group demonstrates its exclusive historical 
stewardship over a given territory, it needs to offer no further evidence 
with respect to the “sufficiency” of its occupation.40  
This conceptual tightening redirects the tone and the evidentiary focus 
of the inquiry. The very concept of sufficient occupation suggests a 
threshold. It invites a comparison between Indigenous and Euro-Canadian 
conceptions of land and property that veers easily into the ethnocentric 
filtering of Indigenous societies’ relationship to their lands through 
common law conceptions of property. The vague requirement that “cultural 
sensitivity” be shown in assessing whether the common law threshold is 
met does not adequately address the inherent bias of this framework.  
An inquiry revolving around the proof of control presents a 
significantly different framework. Redirecting the evidentiary focus on 
Indigenous societies’ historical recognition of each other’s territorial 
boundaries, it purports to give effect to the international relations that 
prevailed within the Indigenous world when the Crown’s claim to power 
on Indigenous peoples and their territories entered the diplomatic equation. 
Looking into the boundaries that had currency among Indigenous nations 
at that time and accepting them into Canadian law means that the state 
agrees to see Indigenous polities as they saw (and still see) each other  
nations with jurisdiction over themselves and their respective territories  
and to ascribe social power to that Indigenous characterization.41 
Taking the so-called “Aboriginal perspective” into consideration 
acquires a different connotation under the framework focusing on the 
proof of boundaries and exclusive control. It certainly still serves to 
avoid ethnocentric assumptions, but since the goal is to give inter-
Indigenous relations and recognition direct effect in Canadian law, 
Aboriginal practices have an immediate normative weight they did not 
                                                                                                                       
39  Id., at para. 48. 
40  This realization is supported by the Supreme Court’s statement, early in its Tsilhqot’in 
judgment, to the effect that the three elements of the title test  the sufficient, continuous and 
exclusive occupation of the land  should not be considered independently, but as “related aspects 
of a single concept” (id., at para. 31). 
41  Accepting the inter-Indigenous settlement of overlapping claims in the intervening period as 
resolving the issue of boundaries rather than detracting from a title finding participates of the same logic. 
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have when they were examined to see whether they “fit” a common law 
right. An example of the central role of Indigenous intellectual resources 
in the inquiry into their control over the land is provided by the trial 
judge in Tsilhqot’in, Vickers J. In his careful examination of the 
Tsilhqot’in conception of boundaries, he quotes the expert report at 
length: 
It is important to consider the issue of boundaries from the Aboriginal 
perspective. …  
..... 
In Tsilhqot’in semi-nomadic society there were no boundaries in the 
sense that a boundary is currently understood with reference to set 
metes and bounds. In his discussion of Tsilhqot’in boundaries on p. 6 
of his report, Dr. Brealy said: 
‘Reconstructing boundaries of oral, relatively nomadic, 
societies in a cartographic register is an exceedingly hazardous 
undertaking, and never the more so than in the Chilcotin 
country. To begin with, boundary construction in such 
societies is, by definition, rather more a ‘social’, than it is a 
‘geographical’, exercise. In oral societies, boundaries are 
recognized, understood and validated not by maps and plans, 
but from ‘inside the collective’ – i.e. by where creation 
narratives fade, where genealogical linkages can no longer be 
traced, where place names are not recognizable, and where 
languages become unintelligible. Indigenous boundaries often 
do trace, in metes and bounds fashion, defined watersheds, 
creeks or lakes, but even then as much by ‘coincidence’ as 
design and the lesser the degree of physiographic relief the 
more ‘fuzzy’ boundaries tend to get.’42 
Carefully postulating precise boundaries of title claim areas to 
respond to what Vickers J. calls the “contemporary societal demand for 
limits”43 will therefore be an exercise in determining the geographical 
reach of a range of cultural elements  the creation narratives, place 
names and language of the claimant group, and even more importantly, 
its kinship ties and political allegiances. As discussed earlier, the 
intention and capacity of the group to hold the land for its own purposes 
have both a subjective and an objective component. Any evidence of 
                                                                                                                       
42  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2465, 2007 BCSC 1700,  
at paras. 646 and 648 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in (B.C.S.C.)”]. 
43  Id., at para. 649. 
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other Indigenous groups’ knowledge that the land belonged to the 
claimant group, and their attitudes in light of that knowledge, will bolster 
the latter’s title claim. In that regard, it is important to note that the 
Supreme Court foregrounds the claimant group’s laws, their treaties with 
other nations, and their enforcement policies:  
Exclusivity should be understood in the sense of intention and capacity 
to control the land. The fact that other groups or individuals were on 
the land does not necessarily negate exclusivity of occupation. … 
Exclusivity can be established by proof that others were excluded from 
the land, or by proof that others were only allowed access to the land 
with the permission of the claimant group. The fact that permission was 
requested and granted or refused, or that treaties were made with other 
groups, may show intention and capacity to control the land. Even the 
lack of challenges to occupancy may support an inference of an 
established group’s intention and capacity to control.44 
I have thus discussed two implications of the clarification offered by 
the Supreme Court concerning the standard of occupation at common 
law, in particular regarding the fact that it turns on the proof of control 
rather than on the use of land: aside from streamlining the test for title, it 
equips Canadian Aboriginal law to take Indigenous political and legal 
agency much more seriously  affirming a nation to nation relationship 
between the Canadian state and Indigenous societies. I now conclude 
with a third implication, which goes in the same direction. Shifting the 
focus of Aboriginal title law from use to control puts an end not only to an 
emerging double standard in the common law of private property (whereby 
Indigenous claimant groups would have been held to a higher standard than 
adverse possessors), but also to a longer-lived double standard in public 
law, concerning the application of the notion of sovereignty. This notion, 
usually examined by Canadian Courts in Aboriginal contexts for the 
purpose of determining the date when it was asserted by the Crown in 
different parts of the territory that incrementally became Canada, “involves 
both a measure of settled occupation and a measure of administrative 
control”45 but certainly not that the territory as a whole be physically 
occupied, settled or used for any purpose at all.46 Associating the 
                                                                                                                       
44  Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at para. 48. See also McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation”, supra, 
note 11. This explains why I equate the notion of Indigenous control over territory that the Supreme 
Court puts forward in Tsilhqot’in with de jure jurisdiction rather than with simple de facto control. 
45  Tsilhqot’in (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 42, at para. 596, quoting Lambert J., in Delgamuukw 
v. British Columbia, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1395, 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 (B.C.C.A.). 
46  See the discussion above, supra, note 7. 
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occupation required to ground title with the intention and capacity to 
control the land is thus not only correct in private property law, but is 
also the right standard to apply in the realm of law that should be applied 
in the first place to actual nations, as opposed to individual persons in the 
domestic realm. Until that standard is properly applied to Indigenous 
claimant groups, the Canadian state perpetuates the racist vision that 
prevented the recognition of Indigenous nations as the equivalent of 
nation states in the eyes of the European powers colonizing North 
America, and produced the infamous proposition that the continent was 
terra nullius until European powers asserted jurisdiction over it.47  
II. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in still skirted the principle it has 
reiterated since Delgamuukw, that “equal weight” should be given to 
Euro-Canadian and Indigenous perspectives in the legal reasoning 
leading up to the recognition and delineation of Aboriginal rights and 
title. With respect to the title test, the Court merely clarified that the 
standard of occupation that must be met to ground possessory title at 
common law has to do with the intention and capacity to control the land, 
rather than with the manner and use of the land in question. If evidence 
concerning the manner and intensity of land use by the claimant group is 
available, it can of course still be relied upon to show that the group held 
the land for its own purposes, both in its own eyes and in the eyes of 
other Indigenous groups48  but such proof is only subservient to the 
demonstration of historical control. Proving “exclusive” occupation 
should automatically fulfil the criterion of “sufficient” occupation, since 
it is now clear that control underlies those two elements of the title test. 
But this seemingly innocuous clarification of the common law of 
possessory title has poised Canadian Aboriginal law to give effect to a 
much more egalitarian, nation-to-nation relationship between Indigenous 
                                                                                                                       
47  See McNeil, “Indigenous Nations”, supra, note 7; Borrows, supra, note 10; Robert J. Miller, 
Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt & Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of 
Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Felix Hoehn, 
Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 2012). See also Kent McNeil’s critical essay reviewing those two books, 
forthcoming in the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 
48  This approach might be advantageous to Aboriginal groups that would find it more 
challenging to prove their laws at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty than to show their 
regular use of the land through relevant “practices, customs and traditions” at that period of their 
history. 
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nations and the settler state. Indeed, affirming that the title test rests on 
the proof of control puts the issue of Indigenous territories’ boundaries, 
and therefore of Indigenous nations’ recognition of each other’s authority 
and jurisdiction over their respective territories, at the forefront of the 
legal inquiry. It effectively places Indigenous normativity  treaties 
between neighbouring Indigenous nations, permissions granted, denied 
or skirted to enter a group’s territory  at the heart of Canadian law. 
This not only averts the creation of a double standard within the common 
law of private property, but more importantly, it may finally signal the 
end of a long-lived double standard in Canadian public law and at 
international law, whereby the sovereignty of European nations rests on 
the intention and capacity to control a vast expanse of territory  while 
the ownership and jurisdiction of Indigenous nations over territories they 
have occupied for time immemorial is altogether denied, or made to 
depend on more stringent criteria such as the regular use of those lands. 
 
